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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Deeds-Construction-Use of Fee Simple Form Versus Intent To
Convey Life Estate.
The recent case of Oxendine v. Le'is' demonstrates anew the danger
in the attempted use of a printed fee simple form deed to convey other
than a fee. In Oxendine the grantor inserted both before and after the
metes and bounds description words that unequivocally showed an intent to convey only a life estate.2 However, he had also inserted the
word "her" before the word "heirs" in the printed premises, habendum,
and warranty, thus completing the fee simple design of the form deed.
Stating that where the granting clause, habendum, and warranty are
in harmony repugnant clauses will be deemed surplusage, the court
held that a fee had been conveyed.
Although in reaching its decision the court followed the more recent
cases in this area,3 the principle enunciated has not always been the
law in North Carolina. In 1908 this state departed from the strict common law rule that the words in certain technical portions of the deed
controlled the estate transferred. 4 The court, following the purport of
G.S. § 39-1, s adopted the liberal view that the intention of the parties
as gathered from the entire instrument was determinative.8 Adhering
to this view, the court allowed a life estate given by the habendum to
take effect notwithstanding a fee simple was specified in the granting
clause; 7 this holding was extended when the court held that words
following the description which showed that only a life estate was in1252 N.C. 669, 114 S.E.2d 706 (1960).
'In the blank space left for the description of the land he inserted the following: "A life estate in and to the following described tract of land, to wit ....
[Description of land followed.]
"It is distinctly understood . . .that the said Malinda Oxendine Hunt is to
have a lifetime right and full control of the possession of the property herein
conveyed, and the remainder, subject to said lifetime right, is retained by Roy
Oxendine." Id. at 670, 114 S.E2d at 707-08.
'Jeffries v. Parker, 236 N.C. 756, 73 S.E.2d 783 (1953); Artis v. Artis,
228 N.C. 754, 47 S.E.2d 228 (1948).
'At common law a subsequent clause could not cut down a fee given in the
granting clause. Hafner v. Irwin, 20 N.C. 570 (1839).
'N.C. Gen. Stat. §39-1 (1950). The statute states: "When real estate is
conveyed to any person, the same shall be held and construed to be a conveyance
in fee, whether the word 'heir' is used or not, unless such conveyance in plain
and express words shows, or it is plainly intended by the conveyance or some
part thereof, that the grantor meant to convey an estate of less dignity."
*Triplett v. Williams, 149 N.C. 394, 63 S.E. 79 (1908).

SIbid.
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tended to be conveyed would control the fee transferred in both the
granting clause and the habendum.8
On the basis of the above decisions North Carolina was recognized
as one of the leaders of the "modern view" 9 that if the intention of the
parties was apparent from an examination of the four corners of a deed
this intent would be given effect despite violation of any technical rules'0
of construction. This liberal view as applied in these earlier cases had
two distinctive characteristics: first, the formal parts of a deed, both
individually and collectively, were given no more weight in ascertaining
the intent of the grantor than the non-formal parts; and second, there
was a common sense recognition of the fact that in most instances the
inserted words more aptly disclosed the intent of the grantor than did
the formal printed parts. In regard to this last point, the court stated
in Jefferson v. Jefferson"1 that to disregard the inserted matter
would be to ignore a part of the need which in comparison with
the more formal technical expressions used elsewhere might be
considered the clearest expression of intent to be found in the
instrument,2 and explanatory of its seemingly contradictory expressions.'
In 1948 this liberal rule was abandoned. Perhaps this was done
because of difficulty in application, or perhaps in an effort to force more
precise draftsmanship; whatever the reason, the court adopted the
current view that where the more formal parts of the deed (granting
clause, habendum, and warranty) are in harmony, no other language
will be considered.' 3 Consequently, our court no longer relies upon
the valid principle that written words should be given effect over printed
matter.
To the extent that the adoption of this strict rule may force more
precise draftsmanship and deter the use of form deeds for purposes
8
Jefferson v. Jefferson, 219 N.C. 333, 13 S.E.2d 745 (1941). In this case
the court stated that, although not brought out by the record, it seemed probable
that the draftsman used some printed form deed which he endeavored to adopt
for his purposes. Thus the case is factually similar to Oxendine.

'Annot.,

84 A.L.R. 1054, 1063 (1933); 2

N.Y.U. INrTRA. L. Rav. 201 (1956).

ARK.

L. Ray. 114 (1947); 11

10 Some of these "technical rules" are: the regarding of the formal divisions
of the deed as separate and independent, each with its special function, Troy &
North Carolina Gold Mining Co. v. Snow Lumber Co., 170 N.C. 273, 87 S.E.
40 (1915); allowing the granting clause to prevail over other portions of the

deed, Krites v. Plott, 222 N.C. 679, 24 S.E.2d 531 (1943); allowing the first
of repugnant clauses to control, Bryant v. Shields, 220 N.C. 628, 18 S.E.2d 157

(1942).
11219 N.C. 333, 13 S.E.2d 745 (1941).
12Id.
at 338, 13 S.E.2d at 748.
13

Artis v. Artis, 228 N.C. 754, 47 S.E.2d 228 (1948). This raises the question of whether a deed can be divided into "formal" parts and "other" parts, or
must every word be within one of the "formal" sections. The language of the
principal case indicates that there may be parts of a deed which do not fall

within any of the common law groupings.
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other than those for which they are intended, the Oxendine holding is
both commendable and understandable. Inequities may result,14 but
the mere fact that a rule results in an injustice in one particular case
does not warrant discarding it. This rule would be suitable in the
situation where the entire deed is handwritten or typed; in a case like
the principal one, however, it would seem that the injustice outweighs
the merits.
The dissent of Justice Bobbitt points out another danger inherent in
Oxendine-a new interpretative problem has been bred. The rule that
the granting clause will prevail when the habendum and warranty clauses
are in harmony therewith presupposes a working knowledge of what is
encompassed within the term "granting clause." This case highlights
the need for a precise understanding of where the granting clause begins
and ends, as here the words transferring a life estate were inserted immediately after the printed premises of the form deed, and before the
metes and bounds description; in previous cases the limiting words
appeared after the description.' 5
There is a dearth of information in North Carolina as to exactly
what constitutes the granting clause; this probably is a result of the fact
that prior to Oxendine there had been no need to discuss the subject.
Generally, the operative words of conveyance which appear in the
premises are referred to as the "granting clause."'16 In the principal
case, however, the court took the position that only the operative words
printed in the premises could be considered within the granting clause,
thus excluding the inserted material. Artis v. Artis17 stated that
"ordinarily the premises and granting clauses designate the grantee and
the thing' s granted . . . .""I Following this it would seem that when
the inserted words are taken into consideration, the thing granted was

"Although

the court may force lawyers to be more precise, it is not going to

prevent a layman from using a form deed and trying to adopt it for his purposes. To require of the layman the same degree of skill that is required of the
lawyer obviously will result in some injustice.
"In Oxendine limiting words appeared after as well as before the description.
" THomrsoN, A PRAcTicAL TRFATIsE ON ABSTRACTS AND TTLP-s § 302 (2d
ed. 1930).
-1228 N.C. 754, 47 S.E2d 228 (1948).
18 It is not clear whether the "thing" granted refers to the estate granted or
to the land itself. Bryant v. Shields, 220 N.C. 628, 18 S.E.2d 157 (1942), on
which the definition is based, seems to indicate that it refers to the actual land
granted. However, for authority indicating that the granting clause designates
the estate granted see BALLENTINE, THE PREPARATION OF CoNTRAcTS AND CONvEyAicES 73 (1929)
("interest conveyed"); BuRBY, LAw REFRESHER-REAL
PROPERTY 93 (1958) ("quantum of the estate"); 7 THomPsoN, CO mmETARIES
ON THE MoDERN LAw OF REAL RROPERTY § 3522 (perm. ed. 1939) ("interest

conveyed"); SACKMAN, TI-LEs § 3.4 (1959) ("character of the estate conveyed").
10
Artis v. Artis, 228 N.C. 754, 760, 47 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1948). (Emphasis
added.)
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not a described tract of land, but a "life estate in and to the following
described tract of land." °
Oxendine points to the possible necessity that the court in the future
may have to define the "granting clause" with some exactness. At the
present various interpretative problems might arise in application of the
Artis-Oxendine rule, such as: where the granting clause begins and
ends, and therefore, whether or not particular words are included;
whether a draftsman using a form deed can add to the printed granting
clause, and if so, what is the result of conflicting words within the
granting clause. Thus it is questionable whether the presumably
desired result of certainty has yet been achieved.
H. MoRRIsoN JOHNSTON, JR.
Federal Income Taxation-Non Taxable Gift Versus
Taxable Compensation.
Frequently the taxpayer must decide whether a particular payment
is the receipt of income in the form of compensation- or a non-taxable
gift.2 The decision is problematical, for the legal distinctions between
them are nowhere clearly expressed. If the taxpayer cautiously classifies the receipts as compensation, he might increase his tax burden needles!ly. Alternatively, his election to exclude such receipts from gross
income faces possible challenge by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
Recently the Supreme Court of the United States decided three
cases involving the "gift versus .compensation" issue. 3 The case of
Comnissioner v. Duberstein4 grew out of a fairly common business
situation. The taxpayer, president of a corporation and a business
friend of one Berman, president of another corporation, supplied at
Berman's request the names of potential customers for Berman's com" In Oxendine the court clearly did not consider the inserted material part
of the granting clause, but there was a dissent as to this. Also, in Ocendine
the majority merely laid down a rule of exclusion, which leaves much to be
desired as to definiteness.
1
INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 61(a): "Except as otherwise provided in this
subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items: (1) Compensation for services,
including fees, commissions, and similar items. . ."
2
INT. Rxv. CODE oF 1954, § 102(a): "Gross income does not include the
value of property acquired by gift; bequest, devise, or inheritance."
"'The Government, urging that clarification of the problem typified by these
two cases was necessary, and that the approaches taken by the Courts of Appeal.
for the Second and the Sixth Circuits were in conflict, petitioned for certiorari. . . . On this basis, and because of the importance of the question in the
administration of the income tax laws, we granted certiorari ...

sioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 283-84 (1960).
'363 U.S. 278 (1960).

"

Commis-,
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pany. Berman offered to give the taxpayer a Cadillac car, but the
taxpayer did not need or desire a car, nor had he expected compensation.
Nevertheless, he reluctantly agreed to accept the car. He did not include
the value of the car in his gross income. The Commissioner assessed
a deficiency and the Tax Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed. 5
The case of Stanton v. United States" concerned the payment of a
"gratuity" to an employee by his employer at the time of his resignation. The taxpayer had been employed approximately ten years as
comptroller of a corporation and as president of its wholly owned
subsidiary, receiving an annual salary of $22,500. The directors voted
a gratuity of $20,000 in appreciation of his services, provided he relinquish all rights and claims to any benefits from the corporation's retirement and pension funds other than a return of his contributions to
the fund. He was not required to furnish any services after his resignation. In a refund suit, the district court sitting without a jury found
that the payments were a gift. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed.7
The case of United States v. Kaisers presented the question of
whether payments by a labor union constitute a gift or taxable income
to a striking non-member. The taxpayer was employed by the Kohler
Company when the UAW called a strike at the company's plant in 1954.
He was not a member of the union but he did support the strike. Having
no other means of support and not being entitled to receive welfare aid,
the taxpayer requested assistance from the union. In keeping with its
policy of aiding both members and non-members in need, the union
supplied food vouchers worth six dollars a week and nine dollars cash
per week for rent. He was not required to picket but did so anyway.
In a refund suit, a jury found that the union's assistance constituted a
gift, but judgment notwithstanding the verdict was entered for the
government on the ground that the assistance was income as a matter
of law. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and
reinstated the jury verdict 9
Decisions in these three cases were handed down by the Supreme
Court on the same day, and in each case the decision was based upon a
'Duberstein v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1959). The court
reasoned that the taxpayer had met his burden of proof that the payment was
intended as a gift and not taxable compensation.

8363 U.S. 278 (1960).
'Stanton v. United States, 268 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1959). The court reasoned

that the taxpayer had not met the burden of proving that the commissioner was
wrong in his determinatoin that the payment was taxable compensation.
8363

U.S. 299 (1960).

"Kaiser v. United States, 262 F2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958). The court reasoned
that the payments were consistent with charity and thus constituted a gift and
not taxable compensation.
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concept of limited appellate review. The Court completely avoided a
decision on the merits of the cases which would have helped to clarify
the gift versus compensation issue. The Court pointed out that the
trier of fact, being closer to the situation, could more properly decide.
the issue, and, where the trial is by a judge sitting without a jury,
reversal should follow if, but only if, the decision is "clearly erroneous."
But where there is a jury trial under proper instruction, the only determination to be made on appeal concerning this issue is whether the
verdict can be supported on the evidence. This limitation would not,
however, obviate appellate review upon other grounds.
In the Duberstein case the Court held that the Tax Court's finding
for the Commissioner was not "clearly erroneous" and reversed the
court of appeals. In the Stanton case the Court found that the district
court's finding of a gift was so "sparse and conclusory" that it afforded
no revelation of that court's concept of the determining facts and legal
standard. judgment of the court of appeals was vacated and the case
remanded to the district court.10
In the Kaiser case it was found that the jury had been properly instructed and that there was evidence to support its decision for the taxpayer. The court of appeals' judgment was affirmed.
The Government had requested the Court to promulgate a new test
to serve as a uniform standard for determination of what constitutes a
gift, namely that gifts should be defined as transfers of property made
for personal as distinguished from business reasons. 1' The Court unequivocally rejected this test, feeling that the varying fact situations of
such cases render it impossible to apply a uniform standard and that
the trier of fact, being closer to the situation, can apply its "experience
with the mainspring of human conduct" to all the factors and determine
when a transfer amounts to a gift. The Court also said that if a test
was desirable, Congress was the proper body to establish one by an
12
amendment to the code, as was done in the case of prizes and awards.
The Court then left the issue of gift versus compensation to be decided
on a case-by-case basis.
In previous decisions dealing with gifts the Supreme Court has laid
down some broad rules of thumb, and a review of them will indicate
something of the rationale used by the Court in deciding cases involving
this issue.

"0Stanton v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). Upon retrial the district court judge found that the payment was a gift stating that the
evidence showed that it was the employer's intention to make a gift.
11 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284 n.6 (1960).
12
INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 74. This section, new in the 1954 code, removed
prizes and awards from the gift versus compensation question and established
separate tests for determination of the tax consequence upon receipt of a prize or
award.
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(1) Since the Internal Revenue Code definitely distinguishes between compensation on the one hand and gifts on the other, these terms
are and were meant to be mutually exclusive. A transfer cannot be both
a gift and a payment of compensation.' 3
(2) "Gifts" is a generic word of broad connotation which derives
its meaning from the particular statute. In the Internal 4Revenue Code,
it denotes the gratuitous receipt of financial advantages.'
(3) The payment for services, even though voluntary, is nevertheless
compensation within the tax statute. The form of the payment is im15
material as is the fact that it may not be paid directly to the taxpayer.
(4) If the payments to the employees of a business enterprise are
made by persons interested in its success or the maintenance of the
employee's good will and loyalty, there is an inference that the payments
are intended as compensation."O
(5) The lack of any constraining force of a moral or legal duty or
the lack of the incentive of any anticipated benefit other than the satisfaction which flows from the performance of a generous act is important
but not determinative. 17
(6) A gift is nonetheless a gift because inspired by gratitude for
past faithful service of the recipient where it amounts to nothing more
than the acknowledgment of an historical fact as a reason for making
the gift.'
(7) The discharge of a legal obligation to make the payments for
services rendered is in no sense a gift and it is irrelevant that the payor
derives no economic benefit from these transfers.' 9
" Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 39 (1937) (dictum). The payments
were made by a corporation to employees of a predecessor corporation who were
not retained in the employment of the new corporation. The payments were held
to be gifts to the employees.
" Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 330 (1943) (dictum).
Partial forgiveness of back rent and cancellation of accrued interest on notes did
not create taxable income to the debtor taxpayer when the forgiveness was found
to be gratuitous. But see Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949).
" Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279, U.S. 716, 730 (1929) (dictum).
Voluntary payment by the employer of the income taxes assessable against the
employee constituted additional taxable income to such employee. For payments
of property other than money see Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956),
involving stock options and Neville v. Brodrick, 235 F,2d 263 (10th Cir. 1956),
involving transfers of stock.
" Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S.. 34, 41 (1937) (dictum).
27 Ibid.
18
Id. at 44.
Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952) (dictum). "In the legal
sense payment of a prize to a winner of a contest is the discharge of a contractual
obligation. The acceptance by the. contestants of the offer ... . creates an enforceable contract. The discharge of legal obligations-the payment for services
rendered or consideration paid pursuant to a contract-is in no sense a gift." Id. at
713.
N

1"
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(8) Payments to an employee
by an employer to secure better
20
services are plainly compensation.
(9) "A gift in the statutory sense... proceeds from a 'detached and
disinterested generosity' . .. 'out of affection, respect, admiration, charity
or like impulses' . . . And in this regard, the most critical consideration ... is the transferor's 'intention' .... 'What controls is the intention with which payment, however voluntary, has been made.' "21
Applying these rules of thumb to the facts in the Duberstein, Stanton
and Kaiser cases, there does not appear to be any way to question the
conclusions of the respectvie triers of fact. That is not to say, however,
that the conclusion would find universal acceptance, for these cases are
close to the line and could have been decided either way. The Court
seems to imply that it would have affirmed the decisions of the trier of
fact even if these cases had been decided conversely in the first instance.
While decisions of the lower courts and the Tax Court in this area
have been limited to the particular facts in each individual case, it is
possible to indicate what elements of several basic situations have been
more or less determinative in these decisions. 22 The cases from these
courts fall into these categories: formal employer-employee relationships;
reorganizations and sales of business; payments upon retirement; death
benefits to the employee's family or estate; and informal business relationships.
In a formal employer-employee relationship, the payments are usually
made pursuant to the employment contract. Such payments are compensation for services rendered even though no service is ever performed. 23 Additional payments above the employee's basic salary or
wage are regarded as compensation as long as they bear a fixed relationship to the employee's length of service and present salary. 24 Itdoes
not matter what designation the employer has given these additional
payments 25 or that the employer does not take a deduction for tax purposes.26 The relationship is an indication that the payments were meant
" Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243, 247 (1956) (dictum). Here there

was a stock option plan with an arrangement whereby an employer transferred
valuable consideration to his employee for services. The employee taxpayer
realized taxable gain upon exercising the option. Special treatment is given to
employee stock option under section 421 of the 1954 code where, if the plan
qualifies, the tax consequences will be different from that in the Lo Bue case.

"1Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960) (dictum).
"This is not intended to be an exhaustive review of all cases in this area.
" George B. Lester, 19 B.T.A. 549 (1930). Contra, Estate of David R. Daly,
3 B.T.A. 1042 (1926).
"Painter

v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Tex. 1953); N. H. Van

Sicklen, Jr., 33 B.T.A. 544 (1935).

"Wallace v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Thomas v. CommisContra, Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F.2d 286 (9th

sioner, 135 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1943).

Cir."'Thomas
1929).
v. Commissioner, supra note 25.
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as compensation; and where it is absent, the court has held the payment
to be a gift.27 The one exception appears to be in the case of articles of
small value given on special occasions where there arises a justifiable
inference of gift. Thus the treasury has recently ruled that things of
nominal value given by an employer to his employees at Christmas can
be gifts even though they are used to promote good will and are deducted as business expenses. 28 But a wedding gift, in recognition of
service, has been held to be compensation. 29 It would seem that
wherever payments are made by an employer to his employee it is extremely doubtful that they can be treated as gifts, for it will be difficult,
if not impossible, to rebut the presumption that the payments are intended as compensation for services, either past or future. An employer
is in business for profit, not philanthropy, the courts seem to say.
Key employees often receive additional payments when a business is
sold or undergoes reorganization. These payments are considered compensation where they bear a relationship to the length of service and
previous salary scale80 or where the transferor deducted them for tax
purposes.3 ' The theory is that the payments were intended as additional
compensation for past services, and a deduction by the employer is
treated as strong evidence of this intention. This inference has even
attached to payments made to an employee when he resigned voluntarily.3 2

Such an inference may be overcome only in very special cir-

cumstances. Where the payments were voted by the stockholders of
the successor corporation, they have been treated as gifts on the theory
that moral and legal obligation is lacking; and it did not matter that the
stockholders of the successor corporation were essentially the same as
33
those of the old corporation.
Extra payments to employees at the time of their retirement, in
recognition of their long and faithful service, have been held to be
compensation for past services, especially where the employer takes a
deduction in his return 4 The reason for the employee's retirement
does not matter.35 There is, however, an exception in favor of clergymen who receive such payments in excess of contract provisions upon
retirement, these being considered tokens of gratitude and appreciation
"8 Hoefle v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1940).
" Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 17.
'" Nickelsburg v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1946).
1o Carragan v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 246. (2d Cir. 1952) ; Poorman v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1942).
" Chauncey L. Landon, 16 B.T.A. 907 (1929).
" See Noel v. Parrott, 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926). Contra, Cunningham v.
Commissioner, 67 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1933).
" Hall v. Commissioner, 93 F2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1938).
" Willkie v. Commissioner, 127 F2d 953 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Fisher v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1932).
" Ruth Jackson, 25 T.C. 1106 (1956) ; L. Gordon Walker, 25 T.C. 832 (1956).
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and consequently gifts.3 6 Under similar circumstances, the retirement
benefits of an officer of a non-profit organization have been treated as a
gift.37 In summary it seems that an employee of a profit making organization as opposed to a non-profit or tax-exempt one will have difficulty
sucessfully claiming that additional payments received due to reorganization, sale or retirement were gifts. The profit motive of business does
not allow for much charity, and the inference that these were payments
for past services as well as the evidence of the employer's deduction will
be difficult to overcome. A non-profit organization, the courts imply,
is more likely to have motives of charity.
Death benefits paid by an employer to the employee's family are
compensation when paid pursuant to the employment contract 88 or where
the payments are made as a general practice so as to become a moral
obligation. 9 But if the benefits are entirely voluntary and the beneficiary has rendered no service, they can be considered gifts regardless
of whether the employer has taken a deduction for the payments in his
return.40 Payments to the employee's estate are treated in the same
way as payments to the family.4 1 For 1954 and later years, section
101 (b) of the 1954 Code will affect the taxation of these benefits. Under this section, up to $5,000 may be paid to the beneficiaries of a deceased employee free of income tax. Nothing in the way of a contract
or plan is required to achieve this tax free status. But if the payments
are gifts, they are not subject to the provisions of this section and are
42
entirely excluded from taxation.
The discussion of the lower court decisions up to this point has
dealt with the formal employer-employee situation. There are also problems where this relationship does not exist. In this area the principle
factor in determining the question of gift or compensation is whether
the payments were made in a business context. Token payments received for friendly services, such as non-professional investment advice,43 endorsement of a note,44 and voluntary legal services" have been
held to be gifts. But where the payment was given to the taxpayer as
"Abernethy v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Mutch v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Schall v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 893 (5th
Cir. 1949).
"'Adams v. Riordan, 57-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 1 9770 (D. Vt. 1957).
Flarsheim v. United States, 156 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1946).
Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1958).
"0United States v. Kasynski, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960) ; United States v.
Allinger, 275 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1960); Bounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876
(4th Cir. 1958). Contra, Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. No. 10 (1960).
" Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951); Estate of
Frank J. Foote, 28 T.C. 547 (1957).
,' United States v. Reed, 277 F2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960).
"8Estate of Grace G. McAdow, 12 T.C. 311 (1949).
" Dupuy G. Warrick, 44 B.T.A. 1068 (1941).
"'J.Marion Wright, 30 T.C. 392 (1958).
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consideration for aid in furthering the business for the transferor and
the payment bears a relationship to the value of the service rendered, it
has been held to be compensation for services. 48 Also where the payment was to a taxpayer for services in arranging a business transaction
between other individuals, and the transferor is one of these individuals,
47
Tips 48 and rethe payment is held to be compensation for services.
49
wards for special services are payment for services. Legal fees shared
50
As might
by lawyers for handling a case are held to be compensation.
a houseas
acting
for
husband
be expected, an allowance to a wife by her
51
In short, if there is a business
wife was not income for tax purposes.
connotation in the service and the payment bears a relationship to the
value of the service, the payment is very likely to be classified as compensation.
In conclusion it can only be reiterated that there are no clearly
defined meanings for the terms "gifts" and "compensation" as used in
the Internal Revenue Code nor is it probable that they will ever be
clearly defined.52 The Supreme Court in the principal cases did not
attempt to resolve the definitional problems. As a result, there is no
clear cut course for the taxpayer to follow, no precise rule for the tax
lawyer to apply. If, a transfer of money or other property is contemplated, and a gift is intended, there are several precautiohs the observance
of which might insure the completion of a gift and not the creation of
taxable compensation within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.
(1) The term "gift" should be used and such terms as "bonus.," "salary,"
and "honorarium" should be avoided in any formal letters or resolutions
concerning the payment. . (2) References to any services which the
donee might have rendered should be avoided. (3) If the transferor
is a corporation, the transfer should be ratified by the stockholders.
(4) The use of a salary schedule and length of service should be avoided
when deciding upon the amount of payment. (5) The use of any reference to possible future payment or to a general practice of making such
payments should be avoided. (6) A deduction for tax purposes for
these payments should not be taken.
FraNcis N. MILLETT, JR.
Alford J. Williams, Jr., 29 B.T.A. 892 (1934).
47 Lundsford v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1933).
' Roberts v. Commissioner, 176 F,2d 221 (9th Cir. 1949).
"O.D. 602, 3 Cum. BUXLL. 93 (1920). Reward for the prevention of a bank
robbery was held to be compensation.
" Mertz v. Hickey, 162 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Friedman v. Commissioner,
130 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1942).
" Rosa E. Burkhart, 11 B.T.A. 275 (1928).
" Such lack of clear definition is -also evident in other areas of income tax, for
example, the problem of "interest versus dividends." See John Kelly Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
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Negligence-Common Carriers-Degrees of Care.
In Jackson v. Stancill actions for wrongful death and personal injuries were consolidated against the pilot and the owner of an air-taxi
to recover for damages sustained when the plane crashed while landing.
Plaintiffs alleged that the pilot had committed specific acts of negligence
and that the owner was a common carrier of passengers. The trial
judge charged the jury that the defendants, being "carriers," owed the
plaintiffs as passengers "the highest degree of care ... consistent with
the practical operation and conduct of its business . . ."2 On appeal
the supreme court pointed out that in North Carolina it is only the
common carrier which has the highest degree of care imposed upon it,
not the contract carrier, and ordered a retrial on the issue of whether
the defendant was a common or a contract carrier.
By way of dictum the court said that the phrase "highest degree
of care" does not relate merely to the quantum or degree of care required
to measure up to the standard of ordinary care but that it instead
establishes a different and higher standard 3 by which the common car4
rier's conduct is measured.
1253 N.C. 291, 116 S.E2d 817 (1960).
9 Id. at 296, 116
S.E.2d at 821.
'Justice Bobbitt, dissenting, regards the highest degree of care as descriptive of
the duty of carriers (common or contract) depending upon the circumstances.
He said: "In respect of air travel, ordinary or due care, namely care commensurate
with the known or foreseeable dangers, is no less than the highest degree of care
consistent with the practical operation and conduct of the business." 253 N.C. 291,
305, 116 S.E2d 817, 827 (1960). It seems apparent that Justice Bobbitt would
not agree with the majority that a different standard is applicable in common

carrier cases.

It should also be noted that the charge given by the trial judge in the principal
case clearly made no attempt to create a different standard for the jury to apply.
The trial judge instructed the jury to measure the carrier's duty by "what is called

'the rule of the prudent man,'" and stated that the defendants would be guilty of
negligence only "if they failed to do what a person of ordinary prudence would have
done to perform the duty imposed upon them by law." Record, p. 113.
'This appears to be the first time the North Carolina court has explicitly said
that the duty to exercise the highest degree of care is to be measured by a standard
other than the standard of due care under all the circumstances as tested by what
the reasonable and prudent man would have done. In prior cases our court has
treated the problem more as one of defining the duty which is owed. Harris v.
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 243 N.C. 346, 351, 90 S.E.2d 710, 714 (1956) ; Jenkins
v. City Coach Co., 231 N.C. 208, 56 S.E.2d 571 (1949) (by implication); Humphries v. Queen City Coach Co., 228 N.C. 399, 404-05, 45 S.E.2d 546, 549-50
(1947) (concurring opinion) ; White v. Chappel, 219 N.C. 652, 665, 14 S.E.2d 843,

852 (1941)

(dissenting opinion).

Accordingly in application the standard has

been that of the reasonable and prudent man. See Harris v. Atlantic Greyhound
Corp., 243 N.C. 346, 90 S.E2d 710 (1956) ; Jenkins v. City Coach Co., 231 N.C.
208, 56 S.E2d 571 (1949); Humphries v. Queen City Coach Co., 228 N.C. 399,
45 S.E2d 546 (1947); White v. Chappel, 219 N.C. 652, 14 S.E.2d 843 (1941);
Cates v. Hall, 171 N.C. 360, 88 S.E. 524 (1916) ; Fitzgerald v. Railroad, 141 N.C.
530, 54 S.E. 391 (1906) (dictum). See generally, as to various statements of the
duty by the North Carolina court, Note, 17 N.C.L. Rav. 453 (1939).
It can be seen, however, that the result in the principal case would have been
the same whether the instruction was deemed to relate to the duty or to a different
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While the majority of American jurisdictions hold that the common
carrier owes its passengers the highest degree of care,5 few courts have
explicitly stated, as has North Carolina in the principal case, that a
difference in standards is involved. Instead, most of the courts have
treated the difference in the degree of care owed by a common carrier
as relating merely to the duty imposed by law.6 Moreover, in many
cases, because of the court's brief and perfunctory statement of the issue,
it is impossible to determine whether a difference in standards was
actually within the court's contemplation or whether the court envisioned only a difference in duty within the usual standard, that of due
7
care.
In some cases the language used to state the duty shows that no
difference in standards is involved.8 An early North Carolina opinion
gave the following statement of the duty:
[T]he carrier is required to exercise that high degree of care
...which a prudent man would use in view of the nature and
risks of the business, or, in general, the highest degree of care,
prudence, and foresight•... which the situation and circumstances
demand in view of the character and mode of conveyance, and
which a prudent man engaged in the business as usually conducted would employ'... 9
standard since the record was found to be inadeqaute to establish defendant's status
as a common carrier as a matter of law. This note is concerned chiefly with the
implications raised by the court's discussion of standards of care.
' "It is a well settled rule of law that a carrier owes to a person in a passenger
status the duty to exercise the highest degree of care ... ." Ortiz v. Greyhound

Corp., 275 F2d 770, 773 (4th Cir. 1960).

See. generally 10 Am. JuR. Carriers

§ 1245 (1937); 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 678(a) 1939). Various similar emphatic
phrases are used by the courts to state the degree of care, such as "the utmost care
and diligence," "the utmost caution characteristic of very careful men," 'extraordinary care and caution," or simply "a high degree of care." See generally 10
Am. Jun. Carriers § 1246 (1937) ; 13 C.J.S. Carriers§ 678 (a) (1939).
°E.g., Krentzman v. Connecticut Co., 136 Conn. 239, 70 A.2d 133 (1949);
Johnson v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 265 S.W2d 417 (Mo. 1954) ; Nix v. Gulf,
Mobile & Ohio R.1L, 362 Mo. 187, 240 S.W2d 709 (1951) ; Centofani v. Youngstown Municipal Ry., 157 Ohio St. 396, 105 N.E.2d 633 (1952) ; Gedney v. Clark,
201 Ore. 67, 268 P.2d 357 (1954) ; Werlein v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry., 267 Wis. 392,

66 N.W.2d 185 (1954).

'The
North Carolina court clearly recognizes the distinction between the
terms "duty" and "standard." The opinion in the principal case said: "The difference between ordinary care and the highest degree of care as these terms are
applied in carrier cases is, in final analysis, largely a difference in the degree of
duty, but it also involves a difference in standards." 253 N.C. at 297, 116 S.E2d
at 822.
This distinction will be preserved in this note.
8
E.g., Black & White Cab Co. v. Doville, 221 Ark. 66, 251 S.W.2d 1005
(1952); Ken-Ten Coach Lines v. Siler, 303 Ky. 263, 197 S.W.2d 406 (1946);
North Carolina cases cited note 4 supra.
'Marable v. Railroad, 142 N.C. 557, 562-63, 55 S.E. 355, 357 (1906). And in
Humphries v. Queen City Coach Co., it is said that "'ordinary care,' when that
term is used in defining the duty a transportation company owes to its passengers,
means 'the highest degree of care consistent with the practical operation and conduct of its business. One is the standard and the other is the degree of care
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The implication to be derived from these cases is that no different
standard is intended but that "the highest degree of care" refers to the
quantum of care due under the circumstances as measured by the rule
of the prudent man.
The language used by other courts in discussing the highest degree
of care doctrine is incompatible with the standard of ordinary care and
implies a difference in standards.10 For example in Hill v. Texas, N.M.
& Okla. Coaches, Inc.,-" the court said that the duty of the common
carrier is "to exercise such a high degree of foresight... and prudence
2
. . . as would be used by very cautious, prudent and competent men.'
And in Christoff v. Noto13 it was said: "The degree of care which [a
common carrier] ... owes to a passenger is a high degree of care, not
14
ordinary care, such as one driver-one pedestrian owes to another."
In some jurisdictions statutes have been enacted which define the
care owed by a common carrier. When the statute is strongly worded
and unambiguous in declaring a higher standard, 15 the courts must give
recognition to the legislative intent.16 If on the other hand the statute
will admit of the interpretation that it is merely declarative of the
common law, 17 it is not necessarily regarded as creating a different
standard.. Thus in Johnson v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,' 8 the court
held that the statute related only to the duty, which was to be measured
by the standard of ordinary care. The court said: "[I]t was his duty
under the statute to exercise that degree of care and caution of an
necessary to measure up to the standard." 228 N.C. 399, 404-05, 45 S.E.2d 546,
549-50
(1947) (concurring opinion).
"0 E.g., Christoff v. Noto, 327 Mich. 514, 42 N.WV2d 732 (1950) ; Austin v. St.
Louis & S.F. R.R., 149 Mo. App. 397, 130 S.W. 385 (1910); Robinson v. Duke
Power Co., 213 S.C. 185, 48 S.E.2d 808 (1948); Hill v. Texas, N.M. & Okla.
Coaches, Inc., 153 Tex. 581, 272 S.W.2d 91 (1954).
11153 Tex. 581, 272 S.W.2d 91 (1954).
2
2 Id. at 584, 272 S.W.2d at 92.
13 327

Mich. 514, 42 N.W.2d 732 (1950).

"Id. at 516-17, 42 N.W.2d at 733.
" See GA. CODE AxN. § 18-204 (1935) which declares: "A carrier of passengers
must exercise extraordinary diligence to protect the lives and persons of his
passengers, but is not liable for injuries to them after having used such diligence";
and GA. CODE ANN. § 105-202 (1956) which declares: "In general, extraordinary
diligence is that extreme care and caution which very prudent and thoughtful
persons exercise under the same or similar circumstances .

. .

.

The absence of

such diligence is termed slight negligence."
"See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Mullirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598
(1952).
"'OKLA. STAT. AN. tit. 13, § 32 (1951)
reads as follows: "A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage,
must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a
reasonable degree of skill." MoNT. RFv. CODES ANN. § 8-405 (1947) is identical in
langauge. These are typical of such statutes which have been held merely declarative of the common law. See Taillon v. Mears, 29 Mont. 161, 169, 74 Pac. 421,
423 (1903).
18206 Okla. 455, 244 P.2d 576 (1952).
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ordinarily prudent person whose duty it was to exercise the highest
degree of care."19
A minority of American courts have held that negligence is incapable
of division into degrees, and that since there can be no slight or gross
negligence there can be no slight or extraordinary care. On this
premise these courts refuse to recognize any standard other than due
care under all the circumstances as measured by the rule of the prudent
man.2° They hold that negligence, by definition, excludes liability
for conduct that is reasonable under the circumstances and that the rule
of the prudent man is the only standard by which the jury can intelligently determine reasonableness.
The minority view appears logically to be the sounder 2' because
while "the degree-that is the quantity-of care necessary to measure
up to the standard is as variable as the attendant circumstances," 22
the standard itself would seem invariable and applicable to all negligence
cases since it involves a consideration of every fact, condition and
circumstance existing in the particular case. Considering the broad
requirements of the standard of ordinary care,ns any standard which
exacts more than ordinary care would, it has been said, 24 "require more
1"d. at 458, 244 Pf2d at 579-80; accord, G. A. Nichols Co. v. Lockhart, 191
Okla. 296, 129 P.2d 599 (1942); Chicago, R.. & P. Ry. v. Shelton, 135 Okla. 53,
273 Pac. 988 (1929). See also Riskin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 350 P.2d 831
(Mont. 1960), where the Montana statute is cited as merely defining the carrier's
duty.
"E.g., Union Traction Co. v. Berry, 188 Ind. 514, 121 N.E. 655, aff'd on

rehearing, 188 Ind. 525, 124 N.E. 737 (1919); Chicago & Calumet Dist. Transit
Co. v. Stravatzakes, 156 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. App. 1959) ; Bannister v. Berkshire St.
Ry., 301 Mass. 598, 18 N.E.2d 342 (1938); Nadeau v. Fogg, 145 Me. 10, 70
A.2d 730 (1950); Raymond v. Portland Ry., 100 Me. 529, 62 Atl. 602 (1905);
McLean v. Triboro Coach Corp., 302 N.Y. 49, 96 N.E2d 83 (Ct. App. 1950);
Stierle v. Union Ry., 156 N.Y. 70, 50 N.E. 419 (Ct. App. 1898); Picket v.
Rochester Transit Corp., 274 App. Div. 1088, 86 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1949); Barbato v.
Vollmer, 273 App. Div. 169, 76 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1948) ; O'Brien v. New York Ry.,
185 App. Div. 867, 174 N.Y. Supp. 116 (1919).
.1 Most writers support this view. See 1 BEvm, NEGLxc EC 15 (4th ed. 1928);
2 HARPER & JAxEs, TORTS 945-46 (1956); PRossER, TORTs § 33 (2d ed. 1955);
SALMOND, TORTS § 125 (12th ed. 1957) ; 1 STREET,, FouNDArIoNs OF LEGAL LIAiLarry
98 (1909); Wimnin',
TORTS 494 (6th ed. 1954); Green, High Care and Gross
Negligence, 23 ILL. L. Rzv. 4 (1928).
" Rea v. Simowitz, 225 N.C. 575, 579, 35 S.E.2d 871, 874 (1935).
" In Union Traction Co. v. Berry, 188 Ind. 514, 121 N.E. 655, aff'd on rehearing, 188 Ind. 525, 124 N.E. 737 (1919), the court stated the requirements of the
standard of ordinary care as follows: "the party owing the duty to use ordinary
care must take into consideration the character and extent of the dangers incident
to the business . . .he must regard the conditions and the circumstances which
surround and attend it... he must foresee every danger that a person of reasonable foresight would anticipate, and he must take every means of guarding against
such dangers that reasonable judgment and prudence would suggest .... ." Id. at
526, 124 N.E. at 738. See also for the requirements of the law's reasonable and
prudent man, 2 HARPER & JAmES, TORTS § 16 (1956) ; PRossER, ToaRs § 31 (2d ed.
1955).
"Union Traction Co. v. Berry, supra note 23.
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of ordinary intellectual endowments would be capable
care than a person
25

of exercising."
Few of the courts which have attempted to establish a different
standard in common carrier cases have undertaken to explain the
standard in significant detail.26 As in the principal case, courts do not
say how the standard is to be explained, in what terms, or how such
standard compares with that of the prudent man whose conduct is
reasonable in view of all the circumstances.
Since the negligence action is founded on a breach of legal duty, it
is the function of the court to declare and explain the duty which the
law imposes.- In the ordinary negligence case the defendant's duty
is explained in terms of how the reasonable man would have acted in
similar circumstances. In the common carrier cases, however, the
courts do not resort to analogy but simply rest on a statement of an
abstraction-the highest degree of care. The problem becomes one of
imagining in any real sense how the defendant should have acted, or
in other words, of determining what in addition to all that is "reasonable" is to be expected of the defendant. It is thus a question of whether
or not the higher standard is capable of intelligent application by the
28

jury.
In spite of the short-comings of the majority view, both in legal
theory and practical application, it has been suggestedm that it has at
least one salutary effect. By describing the common carrier's duty in
N.E. at 737-38.

at 526-27, 124
In explaining the higher standard courts have generally found it sufficient
to intimate to the jury that they are to require "something more" or "something
different" than would be required of an ordinary individual. See, e.g., Robinson
v. Duke Power Co., 213 S.C. 185, 48 S.E.2d 808 (1948) ("higher than that which
is ordinarily required of an ordinary individual").
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180 (1953) provides that the trial judge "shall declare
and explain the law arising on the evidence given in the case." The provision is
mandatory. Smith v. Kappas, 219 N.C. 850, 15 S.E.2d 375 (1941). The chief
purpose of a charge is to help the jury understand the case clearly and arrive at
a correct verdict. Glenn v. City of Raleigh, 246 N.C. 469, 98 S.E.2d 913 (1957).
For this reason "the courts have been rather meticulous, especially in the matter
of negligence, in requiring that, the law be explained in its connection with the
facts in evidence.' Smith v. Safe Bus Co., 216 N.C. 22, 23, 3 S.E.2d 362, 363
(1939). The statement of general principles of law, without an application to the
specific facts involved in the issue, is not a compliance with the provisions of the
statute. Hauser v. Forsyth Furniture Co., 174 N.C. 463, 93 S.E. 961 (1917).
Without substantial compliance with the statute there can be no assurance that the
verdict represents a finding by the jury under the law and on the evidence presented. Smith v. Kappas, supra. See generally, Paschal, A Plea For A Return
To Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in North Carolina, 36 N.C.L.
REv. 1 (1957). Quaere whether a standard incapable of intelligent application by
the jury, if so determined, would be grounds for reversal under the statute.
2 See Union Traction Co. v. Berry 188 Ind. 514, 121 N.E. 655, aff'd on rehearing 188 Ind. 525, 124 N.E. 737 (1919) wherein it is determined that such a standard
is incapable of a definition which would enable a jury to apply it intelligently.
See 2 HAuPE & JAmEs, ToRTs § 15.4 (1956).
35Id.
28
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terms of the highest degree of care, the jury is impressed with the
peculiar hazards and the unusual advantages inherent in that calling.
It may be that these courts feel constrained to emphasize the most
significant circumstance-defendant's being a common carrier-in the
most conclusive way possible, in a legal rule or definition. This approach certainly seems to slight the opportunity courts have of describing all the circumstances in as great detail as deemed necessary
and suggests taking the easy "way out."
It is submitted that the proposition that a common carrier owes
its passengers the highest degree of care should be put to the jury
not in terms of a standard of conduct different from that imposed on
others, but rather in terms of what was reasonable and proper in view
of the duty owed and all the conditions and circumstances of the particular case. A charge of this nature would accord with the universally
accepted legal concept of the prudent man and at the same time make
intelligible to the lay triers of fact what precisely they are to decide."0
JOHN

H. P. HELMS

Sales-Disclaimer of Implied Warranty Void Because Against
Public Policy.
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.' the Supreme Court of
New Jersey considered the effect of disclaimer and limitation of liability
clauses contained in a standard automobile warranty. 2 The plaintiff
purchased an automobile from a local dealer as a gift for his wife. A
warranty was set forth in fine print on the reverse side of the sales contract, together with a stipulation that there were no warranties, either
express or implied, except as provided for in the agreement s The
disclaimer was contained in the following words: "[T]his warranty being expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and
all other obligations or liabilities . . . ."
In addition, the following
" The charge by the trial judge in the principal case would have this effect.

See note 3 supra.
1-32 N.J. 358, 161 A2d 69 (1960).
2The warranty is the uniform warranty

adopted by the Automobile Manufacturers Association. It is used by all the major automotive manufacturers in the
sale of new automobiles. Thus, well over 90% of new car sales were covered by
this warranty and disclaimer. See Id. at 390, 161 A.2d at 87.
' The express warranty provided: "The manufacturer warrants each new
motor vehicle (including original equipment placed thereon by the manufacturer
except tires), chassis or parts manufactured by it to be free from defects in material
or workmanship under normal use and service. Its obligation under this warranty
being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof which shall,
within ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaseror
before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event shall first occur,
be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and which its examination
shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective. . . ." Id. at 367, 161
A.2d at 74. (Emphasis by the court.)
'32 N.J. at 367, 161 A.2d at 74.
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provision appeared in small print on the front side of the contract:
The front and back of this Order comprise the entire agreement affecting this purchase and no other agreement or understanding of any nature concerning same has been made or entered
into, or will be recognized ....
I have read the matter printed on the back hereof and agree
to it as a part of this order the same as if it were printed above
my signature ....
Within two weeks after the delivery of the automobile the plaintiff's
wife had an accident while driving it due to a mechanical failure.
Actions against the manufacturer and the dealer were brought by the
wife6 for the personal injuries and by the husband for property damages,
each alleging a breach of implied warranty. The defendants contended
that the disclaimer barred any recovery except for the replacement of
parts. The court, however, found that the disclaimer was void as
being against public policy and allowed recovery.
The implied warranty of merchantability arose in order to alleviate
the harsh results of the rule of caveat emptori Whereas the latter
allowed the vendee virtually no recourse against a seller of defective
goods, the implied warranty placed upon the vendor the duty to provide
goods which were at least capable of being used for the purpose in8 Id. at 366, 161 A2d at 73-74.
Privity of contract is generally required for recovery on an implied warranty.

State ex rel Bond v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 146 Md. 390, 126

Atl. 105 (1924). However, some courts have recognized an exception where the
product is noxious or dangerous. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich.
683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409
(1932) ; Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913). Although
this exception is generally found in cases involving food and drugs, the court in
the principal case pointed out that the harmful potential of a defective automobile
was analogous and held that the implied warranty ran with the sale of the automobile from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer. The court went further
toward eliminating entirely the requirement of privity in this "dangerous products"
area by holding that the warranty extended to the purchaser's wife, who was not a
party to the contract, on the grounds that it was reasonably anticipated that she
would be a user of the automobile. This was carried even further in a dictum to
the effect that the warranty extends to other "members of his family, and to other
persons occupying or using it with his consent." 32 N.J. at 414, 161 A.2d at 100.
Query how much further a court holding an occupant could recover on an implied
warranty would have to go in order to allow a pedestrian injured by an automobile
to recover on the same theory.
In Wyatt v. North Carolina Equip. Co., 253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E.2d 21 (1960),
the operator of construction equipment, an employee of the vendee in the sales contract, brought suit for personal injuries against the vendor, alleging breach of
warranty. Held: An employee is not in privity, and therefore cannot maintain an
action against the seller. Thus, North Carolina would apparently not join the
New Jersey court in holding that the warranty ran to those using the automobile
with the consent of the owner.
With respect to the requirement of privity see 30 N.C.L. Rav. 191 (1952) ; 37
N.C.L. Ra,. 205 (1959) ; 7 RutGams L. Ra,. 420 (1953) ; 27 U. CINc. L. REv. 124
(1958).
1 Swift & Co. v. Etheridge, 190 N.C. 162, 129 S.E. 543 (1925).
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tended. Consequently, a disclaimer began to be inserted in sales contracts to enable the vendor to sell goods without liability based on implied
warranty.9
It is generally held that a vendor may contract away liability arising
from an implied warranty,10 and this right is sanctioned by the Uniform
Sales Act."
However, since implied warranties arise to protect the
buyer, courts have generally held that disclaimers must be strictly construed against the seller and must be express in their terms.12 Effective
disclaimers may be found in varying forms, but it is often difficult to
distinguish between some disclaimers which have been held binding13
and others which were ineffective because they were not sufficiently
express.' 4 For example, in Bekkevold v. Potts,15 involving the sale of
a tractor and trailer,. the disclaimer "no warranties have been made in
reference to said motor vehicle by the seller to the buyer unless expressly written hereon at the date of purchase" was held ineffective.
Yet in Butts v. Groover,'6 concerning the sale of a truck, the provision
that "no warranties, express or implied, and no representations, promises or statements have been made by seller unless indorsed hereon, in
writing" was held an effective disclaimer.
Disclaimers of implied warranty which would- be 'sufficiently express
'McConnell v. Jones, 228 N.C. 218, 44 S.E2d 876 (1947) ; Ashford v. H. *C.
Shrader Co., 167 N.C. 45, 83 S.E. 29 (1914). Cf. UNiFORm SALES AcT § 15(1).
See Comment, 23 MiN. L. REv. 784 (1938).
C.J.S. Sales § 317
-TlNiFORm SAL-s Acr (1952).
§ 71. "Where any right, duty, or liability would arise

1077

under a contract to sell or a sale by. implication of law, it may be negatived .or
varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by
custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the contract of sale." The
act has been enacted into law into thirty-three states, the District of Columbia, and
the Panama Canal Zone. 1 UNiFORm LAWS ANNOTATD, Sales, at 7 (Supp. 1960).
"Roberts Distrib. Co. v. Kaye-Halbert Corp., 126 Cal. App. 2d 664, 272 P2d
886 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954) ; Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331 Mich. 576, 50 N.W.2d
162 (1951) ; Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp. v. Shanus, 190 Minn. 5, 250 N.W.
713 (1933) ; Deere & Webber Co. v. Mock, 71 N.D. 649, 3 N.W'.2d 471 (1942).
"The above guarantee is in lieu of and excludes all other guarantees, warranties, obligations or promises, express or implied, by contract or by law . .. ."
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Lea, 198 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1952). "[I]t is understood
and agreed that Greening-Smith Company shall not be held responsible for productiveness and, or, quality of the undersigned's crops." Buckley v. Shell Chemical
Co., 32 Cal. App. 2d 209, 89 P.2d 453 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939). -"We give no ivarranty, express or implied, as to description, quality, productiveness, or any other
matter, or any seeds sent out, and will be in no way responsible for the crop. .
Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931).
" "This contract contains the entire agreement between Seller and Buyer; there
are no other representations, warranties or covenants by either party." Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1954).
"This Contract becomes the entire agreement between the Buyer and Seller and
will contain all representations and agreements.' Torrance v. Durisol, Inc., 20
Conn. Supp. 62, 122 A.2d 589 (Super. Ct. 1956). The product is "not guaranteed
in any way." McPeak v. Boker, 236 Minn. 420, 53 N.W.2d 130 (1952).
19173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
"66 Ga. App. 20, 16 S.E.2d 894 (1941).
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in their terms to bar recovery may nevertheless be rendered ineffective.
A purchaser is, as a general rule, deemed to have notice of and to have
assented to all the terms of the contract, including the disclaimer. 7
However, in recognition of the complexities of modern business contracts in which the disclaimer is placed in the body of the contract, some
jurisdictions have adopted the rule that the seller must have actually
called the attention of the purchaser to the disclaimer clause.' 8 This
rule is readily applied where the disclaimer is hidden in the contract
and calculated to escape attention. 19 It would seem to be applicable to
the facts of the principal case, thus providing an alternative solution
without considering the public policy question.
The court in the principal case recognized that the doctrines of strict
construction and actual notice have been used to avert the effects of an
express disclaimer,20 yet it reached the same result by holding this
disclaimer to be "so inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity."'' l However, the court did not predicate its decision on the more customary public policy consideration of danger to
the public. 22 Rather, it took the view that a disclaimer which the purchaser had to accept due to his unequal bargaining position amounted
to a contract which had not been fairly procured and was thus against
public policy.
Only one decision has been found in which the North Carolina
court has held that an express disclaimer would bar recovery. In this
decision, J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. '. McClainrock,23 the court
held that a disclaimer prevented the purchaser of a piece of agricultural
equipment from proving inferior quality as a defense to the vendor's
suit for the purchase price. The court stated that "personal property
may be sold with or without warranty, and ... from an express stipula24
tion that the property is not warranted a warranty will not be implied."
1

E.g., Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 146 Neb. 230, 19 N.W.2d 51 (1945).

"8Stracener v. Nunnally Bros. Motor Co., 11 La. App. 541, 121 So. 617 (1929) ;
St. Louis Cordage Mills v. Western Supply Co., 54 Okla. 757, 154 Pac. 646

(1916);
Black v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S.C. 112, 155 S.E. 268 (1930).
"0 Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84, 48 S.E.2d 653
(1948).
20 32 N.J. at 392, 161 A.2d at 87.
2"Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
"'In Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110
(New York Citp Munic. Ct. 1939), there was an express disclaimer of any war-

ranties on the sale of baked goods. The plaintiff was injured by a tack impounded

in a cookie and sued for breach of implied warranty. The court refused to allow

the disclaimer to be set up as a bar to the action, stating that it "must be recognized

that the health of the public is of the highest importance to the community and
it is against natural justice and good morals to permit an individual or corporation
to manufacture food containing dangerous foreign substances and to escape the
consequences of his act by a disclaimer. To permit such a disclaimer to be
effective would be against sound public policy." Id. at 880, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
" 152 N.C. 405, 67 S.E. 991 (1910).
2
1Id. at 407, 67 S.E. at 992.

1961]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Thus it appears that the North Carolina court recognizes that disclaimers may be effective.
It is apparent, however, that a disclaimer would not preclude a
recovery of the purchase price by the buyer should the seller furnish
non-merchantable goods. In Williams v. Dixie Chevrolet Co., 25 involving the sale of an automobile, the court stated that the purchaser
could recover for want of consideration if the car were not fit for its
intended use due to the defect. The court said, "The refusal to warrant
against worthlessness would fall with the balance of the supposed contract for want of consideration." 2 6 Of course, if the terms of the disclaimer apply only to quality, it will in no way affect an implied warranty of merchantability.2r
The New Jersey court appears to be the first to declare this standard automobile disclaimer void.28 Courts of other jurisdictions have
given the disclaimer its full effect 29 and have held that it does not
violate public policy.A0 It would seem, however, that the prior cases
have not met the real problem as seen by the New Jersey court-that
while a disclaimer of warranty should be available to parties who choose
so to contract, the imposition of these conditions by virtually all automobile manufacturers does not result in a freely bargained for and
fairly obtained agreement. It is submitted that the solution to this
problem can only be found by invoking the doctrine of public policy.
ROBERT B.

BLYTHE

Torts-Negligently Induced Fright Causing Physical Injury to
Hypersensitive Plaintiff.,
In Williamson v. Bennett' the defendant negligently drove her automobile into that of the plaintiff; plaintiff did not see what had struck her,
but thinking that she had killed a child on a bicycle 2 she became frightened. Plaintiff came to a stop and then saw that an automobile and not
a child had collided with her. Though plaintiff suffered no immediate
'209
N.C. 29, 182 S.E. 719 (1935).
8

Id. at 31, 182 S.E. at 721.
"*Hall Furniture Co. v. Crane Mfg. Co., 169 N.C. 41, 85 S.E. 35 (1915).
" Another provision of the warranty has been attacked. In Mills v. Maxwell
Motor Sales Corp., 105 Neb. 465, 181 N.W. 152 (1920), the court stated, in a
dictum, that it was against "every conception of justice" to allow the manufacturer
to be the sole judge as to whether parts were so defective as to be replaceable.
" Shafer v. Reo Motors, 205 F.2d 685 (3rd Cir. 1953) ; L. R. Cooke Chevrolet
Co. v. Culligan Soft Water Serv., 282 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1955); Hall v. Everett
Motors, Inc., 165 N.E2d 107 (Mass. 1960).
" Brokerick Haulage, Inc. v. Mack-International Motor Truck Corp., 1 App.
Div. 2d 649, 153 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
'251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E2d 48 (1960).
'About a month before the accident plaintiff's brother-in-law had killed a child
on a bicycle when she rode into the side of his car. 251 N.C. at 500, 112 S.E.2d at

49.
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physical injury, later in the day she became nervous and otherwise
mentally upset, which condition became steadily worse. She subsequently complained that the corner of her mouth was drawn, her tongue
swollen, her left side numb, and her swallowing and sleeping impaired.
A psychiatrist testified that her condition was.a conversion reaction3
caused by the accident; he further stated that prior to this the plaintiff
had a more than ordinary proneness to neurosis. 4 The jury found that
defendant's negligence had proximately caused plaintiff's injury and
awarded her $4,000 damages. In reversing the award the supreme
court held that defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of
plaintiff's harm.
Courts in the United States have enunciated a variety of reasons
for denying recovery for physical injury induced by fright. Some
courts 5 have held that the physical consequences of fright were not
the proximate result of defendant's negligence because those consequences were not foreseeable. The better rule would appear to be that
it need only be shown that defendant's negligent act was likely to cause
harm to the plaintiff. When such is the case, defendant should be liable
not only for foreseeable injuries but for all harm resulting therefrom in
an unbroken chain of causation. 6 The negligent defendant should take
his victim as he finds him ;7 thus whether the injury results directly, as
through contact, or indirectly, as through fright, liability would ensue.
Some courts" have held that since there can be no recovery for fright
alone there can be none for the consequences of fright. However, as
stated previously, if the defendant's conduct is negligent, i.e., if it was
3
This is a reaction where emotional and psychological nervousness or anxiety
is so intense that it is converted into a physical symptom. The reaction can also
be described as a post-traumatic neurosis, i.e., the neurosis will appear after the
trauma. Trauma in this sense need not be a physical injury but may be a forceful
psychological effect. Humphreys v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 116 So. 2d 130 (La.
1959).

'The

doctor said further that the plaintiff's symptoms were typically those of

a conversion reaction and that the plaintiff was not malingering.
"E.g., Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898) ; Mitchell v. Rochester
R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
'Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909). Seitz, Ditty and
Foreseeability Factors in Fright Cases, 23 M.RQ. L. RuV. 103, 108-09 (1939);
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. Ray. 260, 270-72 (1921); cf.

Reynolds v. Murph, 241 N.C. 60, 84 S.E.2d 273 (1954); Hart v. Curry, 238 N.C.
448, 78 S.E.2d 170 (1953). Contra, Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285,
47 N.E. 88 (1897); Oehler v. Bamberger & Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 1003, 135 Atl. 71
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 103 N.J.L. 703, 137 Atl. 425 (Ct. Err. & App. 1926).
'Nelson v. Black, 266 P2d 817 (Dist. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 43
C.2d 612, 275 P.2d 473 (1954) ; Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 13 A.2d 677 (1940) ;
see Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265
(1958). Contra, Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., supra note 6; Oehler v. Bamberger

& Co., mipra note 6.
8 St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901) ; Mitchell
v.-Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). Contra, Chiuchiolio v. New
England Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1950).
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reasonably foreseeable that injury would result, then the character of
the causal connection should be irrelevant0
Other courts have denied recovery on policy grounds; they have
stated that a flood of litigation would result if a cause of action were
recognized l ° Notwithstanding these warnings the expected flood of
cases has not developed in those jurisdictions which recognize an
action, 1 and the overwhelming majority of recent decisions have rejected
2
this argument.'
As some opinions state 3 the apprehension of fraud is probably the
reason motivating most courts which deny recovery. 14 This policy
would be just only if all the claims were fictitious. If any claims are
meritorious, it is the duty of the courts to furnish a remedy for them.' 5
The ultimate answer to the fraud argument must lie in the courts' belief
in the ability of our juries to distinguish true from fraudulent claims. 6
North Carolina has had few cases involving negligently inflicted
fright with resulting physical injury. Several cases have involved
injury resulting from fright induced by negligently executed dynamite
"'The fundamental vice of the court's opinion is that it assumes that the plaintiff is alleging her fright as the ground for her recovery, and is alleging the
physical consequences merely in aggravation of the damages to be recovered,
whereas the fact is that she has alleged and proved her physical injury as her
ground of action and ... the fright merely to show the causal- connection between
...
negligence and her physical injury. The opinion shows a complete inability
to distinguish between fright as the injury ... and fright as a necessary link in the
chain of causation . . .'
BOHLEN, TORTS 265-66 (1926).
20 Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) ; Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). Other cases have allowed recovery and have controverted this statement: Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni,
15 Ala. App. 316, 43 So. 205 (1916) ; Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69,
73 At!. 688 (1909) ; Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 Atl. 202 (1907).
"Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141, 158; Goodhart, The Shock
Cases and Area of Risk, 16 MODERN L. REv. 14, 24 (1953); Smith, Relation of
Emotions to Injury and Disease; Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L.
REv. 193, 211 n.47 (1944).
"' "The fear of the successful prosecutibn of fraudulent claims ... has not impressed the majority of judges ... as is evidenced by the fact that of the twenty
jurisdictions which considered this problem for the first time during the present
century, seventeen have granted the right of recovery." Second Annual Report
of the Law Revision Commission, Act, Recommendation and Study Relating to
Liability for Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, State of New York 375,
379-80
3 (1936).
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) ; Comstock
v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) ; Huston v. Freemansburg Borough,
212 Pa. 548, 61 Adt. 1022 (1905).
" See generally Note, Frightand the Court's Fear of Fraud, 23 PENN. B.A.Q.
203 5(1952).
' Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 1 K.B. 669, 681; Note, Mental Disturbance
in the Law of Torts-A Problem of Legal Lag, 6 Wzs. Rzs. L. REv. 384, 386
(1955); 15 CL-KENT L. REv. 323, 326 (1937).
" Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Balodoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Seitz, Relational Fact Situation and Emotional Make-Up as Holding Solution to
Problems in Fright Cases, 20 B.U.L. REv. 676, 679 (1940) ; see Nelson v. Black,
266 P.2d 817 (Dist. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 43 C.2d 612, 275 P.2d 473
(1954); Dimmick v. Follis, 123 Ind. App. 701, 111 N.E.2d 486 (1953).
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blasting. 17 Though these cases contain language 8 that would logically
apply to the fact situation in Williamson, the court in Williamson distinguished the dynamite cases on the basis of the strict liability imposed
on one using a dangerous instrumentality. The court has allowed recovery for mental anguish with resulting physical injury in cases of
willful infliction of mental anguish, 19 browbeatiig bill collectors, 20 negligent handling of dead bodies,-' and negligent transmission of death
messages. 22 Williamson, however, did not discuss these cases.2
The holding in Williamson probably was based on the established
North Carolina position that one cannot recover damages for mental
4
anguish arising from fear for the safety or well-being of another.
The cause of plaintiff's conversion reaction was fear for the safety of a
non-existent 25 child. The North Carolina rule, however, heretofore
has been based on the situation where the physical injury precedes the
mental anguish and the mental anguish is sought to be established as an
element of damages-as where the plaintiff is physically injured and
worries over his inability to support his children. Decisions in other
jurisdictions 26 are in conflict as to whether recovery should be allowed
for injury'caused by fear for the safety of another where the mental
anguish is not an element of damages for a concededly compensable injury but is rather the vehicle which creates the injury itself.
It also seems possible that in Williamson the court denied recovery
on the theory that the plaintiff's neurosis was an intervening cause which
"'Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 73 S.E. 211 (1911); Kimberly v. Howland,
143 N.C. 399, 55 S.E. 778 (1906) ; Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 536, 42
S.E. 983 (1902).
"8"The nerves are as much a part of the physical system as the limbs, and in
some persons are very delicately adjusted, and when 'out of tune' cause excruciating
agony. We think the general principles of torts support a right of action for
physical injuries resulting from negligence, whether wilful or otherwise, none the
less strongly because the physical injury consists of a wrecked nervous system instead of lacerated limbs. Injuries of the former class are frequently more painful
and enduring than those of the latter ... " Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398,
403-04, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906). (Emphasis added.)
"May v. Western Union Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 416, 72 S.E. 1059 (1911).
20 Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936).
" Morrow v. Cline, 211 N.C. 254, 190 S.E. 207 (1937). See also, for a discussion of quasi-property rights, 30 N.C.L. REv. 299 (1952).
" Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943).
23 For an excellent discussion of similar cases see PaossER, TORTS 43-44 (2d ed.
1955).
"'Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925);
Ferebee v. Norfolk So. R.R., 163 N.C. 351, 79 S.E. 685 (1913), aff'd, 238 U.S. 269

(1915).

" 'This would seem to be a step beyond fear for the safety of another person.
"Denying recovery: Southern Ry. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916) ;
Nuckles v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927);
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). Allowing recovery:
Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933); Hill v. Kimball, 76
Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
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broke the connection between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
injuries. The court stated that "the defendant's negligence was not
that cause which 'in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
new and independent cause,' produced plaintiff's injury."2 7 The more
logical view would seem to be that even if the neurosis were an intervening cause it was not a controlling cause; defendant's negligence was
the actual cause of plaintiff's fright, but for which fright plaintiff's latent
28
neurosis would not have resulted in injury.
29
At least one court has stated that a defendant is under no duty to
foresee that a person is extraordinarily susceptible to injury. Another
court30 has made liability depend on whether or not the defendant had
knowledge of plaintiff's abnormal susceptibility. The majority of those
jurisdictions 31 which allow recovery, however, have held that if defendant's negligent conduct was likely to injure an average person then
defendant also would be liable for injury to the specially susceptible.
Although the opinion in Williamson discussed the entire area of
damages for mental anguish and physical injuries resulting therefrom,
32
pointing out the confusion and contradictions among other courts, it
251 N.C. at 507, 112 S.E.2d at 54.
Hall v. Excelsior Steam Laundry Co., 5 La. App. 6 (1925) ; Simone v. Rhode
Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 Atl. 202 (1907) ; Padgett v. Colonial Distrib. Co., 232
S.C. 593, 103 S.E2d 265 (1958); cf. Hanford v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 113
Neb. 423, 203 N.W. 643 (1925); Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 234 N.C. 206, 67
S.E.2d 63 (1951); Riggs v. Akers Motor Lines, 233 N.C. 160, 63 S.E.2d 197
(1951).
"DSpade v. Lynn &
2T

8

Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
" Oehler v. Bamberger & Co., 4 NJ. Misc. 1003, 135 Atl. 71 (Sup. Ct. 1926),
aff'd, 103 N.J.L. 703, 137 Ati. 425 (Ct. Err. & App. 1926).

" Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 13 A.2d 677 (1940); Humphries v. Delta

Fire & Cas. Co., 116 So. 2d 130 (La. 1959) ; Hall v. Excelsior Steam Laundry Co.,
5 La. App. 6 (1925) ; Sutton Motor Co. v. Crysel, 289 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. 1956) ;

Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rav. 193, 260-61 (1944). See generally, 22 ST. JOHN's L. Rv.
135 (1947).
. Jurisdictions which deny recovery for negligently inflicted fright with resuiting physical injury, in the absence of some exception to their general rule,
include: Arkansas-Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920);
Illinois-Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Iowa-Kramer v.
Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N.W. 1091 (1913) ; Kentucky-Morse v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry., 117 Ky. 11, 77 S.W. 361 (1903) ; Maine-Herrick v. Evening Express
Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 Atl. 16 (1921); Massachusetts-Spade v. Lynn &
Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Michigan-Alexander v. Pacholek,
222 Mich. 157, 192 N.W. 652 (1923); Missouri-Strange v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 61
Mo. App. 586 (1895); New Jersey-Legac v. Vietmeyer Bros., 7 NJ. Misc. 615,
147 At. 110 (1929) ; New York-Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E.
354 (1896) ; Ohio-Miller v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499
(1908); Pennsylvania-Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23
Atl. 340 (1892).
States allowing recovery for negligent infliction of fright with resulting physical
injury are: Alabama-Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316,
73 So. 205 (1916); California-Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440
(1918) ; Connecticut-Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941) ;
Georgia-Goddard v. Walters, 14 Ga. App. 722, 82 S.E. 304 (1914); KansasClemm v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928); Louisiana-
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is doubtful that the court's holdilig can be interpreted as firmly placing
North Carolina in the list of jurisdictions denying recovery for a physical
injury resulting from negligently inflicted fright.
RAYMOND

A.

JOLLY, JR.

Laird v. Natchitochas Oil Mill Inc., 10 La. App. 191, 120 So. 692 (1929); Maryland-Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 At. 182 (1933); Montana-Cashin
v. Northern Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934); Nebraska-Netusil v.
Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N.W. 335' (1931); New Hampshire-Chiuchiolio v.
New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930); OregonSalmi v. Columbia & N. R.R., 75 Ore. 200, 146 Pac. 819 (1915); Rhode IslandSimone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 At. 202 (1907) ; South CarolinaPadgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958) ;
South Dakota-Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S.D. 396, 167 N.W. 398 (1918); Tennessee-:-Memphis St. Ry3. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917) ; TexasHill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890); Virginia-Bowles v. May, 159
Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932); Washington-Cherry v. General Petroleum Corp.,
172 Wash. 688, 21 P.2d 520 (1933); West Virginia-Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W.
Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924); Wisconsin-Pankopf v. Henkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123
N.W. 625 (1909). This footnote is a corrected version of the state by state breakdown found in Second Annual Report of the Law Revision Commission, Act,
Recommendation and Study Relating to Liability for Injuries Resulting from
Fright or Shock, State of New York 375, 392 n.34 406 n.80 (1936), and in McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New l'ork, 24 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1,
14 n.40, 16 n.43 (1949).

